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Looking forward, looking back: 
judicial discretion and state legitimation 
in modern Mexico 
Robert Buffington1 
T his essay explores the elite debates surrounding efforts to reform Mexican criminal law that began in the late colonial period and culminated in the 
1931 Federal District Penal Code. More specifically, it argues that elite policy 
makers saw legal reform - in particular the notion of judicial discretion - as a cru-
cial aspect of their efforts to legitimize the state and, in so doing, contributed to the 
«refeudalization» of the post-revolutionary estado papa. 
Cet article explore les débats qui ont entouré, au sein des élites, les tentatives 
entreprises pour réformer le code pénal mexicain à partir de la dernière période de 
la colonisation et qui ont culminé en 1931 dans le code pénal du district fédéral. 
Plus spécialement, il défend la thèse selon laquelle les décideurs politiques consi-
déraient la réforme du droit - et particulièrement la notion de pouvoir discrétion-
naire du juge - comme un élément crucial dans leurs efforts pour légitimer l'État. 
Ils ont par là contribué à la «re-féodalisation» de l'estado papà post-révolution-
naire. 
...if we ignore our ancestors, how they thought, felt and 
acted, we will find ourselves overcome in our own land and 
we will perish in the deeply tangled roots that impede our 
resistance to the assaults of more united peoples with more 
homogeneous aspirations and conscious of their history. 
Miguel Macedo2 
On the surface, Mexican criminal law has closely followed the progressive tra-
jectory depicted in legal historiography3. For most scholars, the new and reformed 
1
 Robert Buffington is an Assistant Professor of History at St. John's University (Collegeville, Min-
nesota). His publications include : Forging the Fatherland: Criminal and Citizen in Modern Mexico 
(Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming), Reconstructing Criminality in Latin America, 
co-edited with Carlos Aguirre (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, forthcoming); «Los Jotos: 
Contested Visions of Homosexuality in Modern Mexico», in Daniel Balderston and Donna Guy, 
(eds.), Sex and Sexuality in Latin America: An Interdisciplinary Reader (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997); and «Revolutionary Reform: Modernization, Prison Reform, and Execu-
tive Power», in Ricardo D. Salvatore and Carlos Aguirre, (eds.), The Birth of the Penitentiary in 
Latin America : Essays on Criminology, Prison Reform, and Social Control, 1830-1940 (Austin : 
University of Texas Press, 1996). He is currently working on the «sentimental education» of turn-
of-the-century Mexican workers. Special thanks to Ricardo Salvatore, Pablo Piccato, Marcus Daniel, 
Michael Meyer, Donna Guy, Kevin Gosner and the anonymous readers for Crime, History, and 
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 Quoted in Ceniceros (1966, p. 147). 
3
 This historiography is extensive. See for example Villa and Zambrano (1957) and the bibliography 
in Refugio Gonzalez (1983, p. 96-108). 
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Penal Codes that followed independence from Spain (1821) represented a series of 
necessary if halting steps towards a modern legal infrastructure4. For legal refor-
mers, modern criminal laws were a harbinger of modern social relations which pre-
sented, like the nation's various constitutions, an ideal to which the progressing 
nation might aspire5. This interpretation has much to recommend it: Mexican peno-
logists understood and acted upon the latest international (primarily European) 
advances in criminal law. Moreover, their legacy persists: Mexico's criminal laws 
were (and are) as modern as any in the world6. 
This progressive vision is somewhat deceptive. Just as modernizing discourses 
like criminology re-articulated traditional concerns about class, race, and gender; 
penology also exhibited strong ties to Mexico's past7. In the tumultuous post-Inde-
pendence decades, most liberal penologists - and penologists were by and large 
liberal - stuck resolutely to revolutionary principles of universal human rights and 
absolute equality under the law. But with the consolidation of liberal power in the 
late nineteenth-century, mainstream policy makers began to construct an elitist 
« scientific politics » that represented - under the guise of Mexicanizing the « meta-
physical » Jacobin agenda of mid-century liberals - a return to colonial-style pater-
nalism, albeit with a technocratic slant8. And, despite significant changes in public 
policy after Mexico's great social revolution (1910-1920), paternalism - this time 
under the auspices of the post-revolutionary estado papá - remained the preferred 
mode for social and legal reform efforts. 
Both visions of Mexican criminal law - one looking forward, the other back -
were part of ongoing elite efforts to re-legitimize political control in the shifting dis-
cursive terrain that announced (or so they hoped) the onset of modernity. These re-
legitimation efforts began with the « enlightened » reforms of late eighteenth-cen-
tury Bourbon monarchs (c. 1760s-1810), took a Jacobin turn after Independence as 
liberals wrested control of the central government from their conservative rivals (by 
1867), acquired a technocratic gloss under Porfirio Diaz's autocratic gaze (1876-
1911), and culminated in the post-revolutionary paternalistic populism of Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940). In practice, legal modernization often produced contention 
and disorder - witness the nineteenth-century liberal « reform » laws attacking cor-
porate privilege that raised the considerable ire of the Catholic Church, Army, and 
incorporated Indian communities. But not all legal reform threatened social order. 
Mexican penologists argued that criminal law with its far-reaching punitive power, 
especially over the recently « empowered » lower classes, represented a particularly 
potent source of political legitimacy. And, as the sovereign « people » came to play 
4
 The Mexican federal system like its North American counterpart gives individual states the right to 
promulgate Penal Codes within constitutional guidelines. In practice, the Federal District Penal Code 
provides the model for most state codes. 
5
 This is, of course, the classic apologia for failing to realize the more radical provisions of the 1917 
Constitution - «obedezco pero no cumplo» as colonial officials typically replied to unenforceable 
royal decrees. 
6
 Sold in inexpensive paperback editions by street vendors outside most courthouses and police sta-
tions, Mexican criminal laws and procedures are also among the most accessible. 
7
 For more on the concerns of Mexican criminologists see Buffington (forthcoming) and Piccato (for-
thcoming). 
8
 On this shift in Mexican liberalism see Hale (1989). 
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an ever larger role in the elite political imaginary (if not in actual politics), popular 
acceptance of legal authority emerged as an area of special concern9. 
In this ideologically-charged context, the somewhat arcane legal issue of judicial 
discretion - the individual magistrate's ability to tailor punishment to suit the crime 
- became an important site of contestation, among elite policy makers at least, over 
the nature of the liberal state. The end result, the 1931 federal Penal Code, was a step 
forward, reflecting the latest international advances in penology; it was also a step 
back, returning judicial discretionary powers eroded by a century of liberal attacks 
on « arbitrary » colonial criminal justice. On the surface, increased judicial discre-
tion promised and, doubtless in some cases, delivered a more responsive criminal 
justice system that buttressed the state's legitimacy much as earlier Bourbon reforms 
had done in the decades preceding Independence10. Moreover, popular pressure -
responding perhaps to a political system bound together by patron-client relations -
encouraged and supported the shift11. At the same time, increased discretion rein-
forced a paternalistic approach to state-citizen relations that would come to fruition 
with tata Cárdenas's consolidation of the estado papá in the late 1930s. 
Social theorist Jürgen Habermas has argued that «refeudalization» is an inevi-
table by-product of the transformation of the Liberal Constitutional State into a 
Social-Welfare State where « publicity imitates the kind of aura proper to personal 
prestige and supernatural representation» typical of pre-Enlightenment European 
monarchies12. This was certainly the case in Mexico. Mexican policy makers saw 
increased judicial discretion - which manifested «the aura proper to personal pres-
tige» of judges - as a form of «publicity » that publicly represented the populist 
aspirations of the post-revolutionary nation-state. Not coincidentally, the decisive 
shift occurred at the precise moment (1929) when a newly-constituted official party 
- precursor to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which still controls the 
presidency - was poised to abandon traditional modes of democratic representation 
in favor of a «modern,» corporatist one-party state. 
The combination of modernity, nationalism, and paternalism has proven potent 
if not quite hegemonic. The 1931 Penal Code, although much revised, is still in 
place. So too, at least for the near future, is the paternalistic political system that pro-
duced it. This remarkable durability, especially in a region not known for stability, 
has been much noted but never adequately explained. And while a definitive expla-
nation for the Mexican « exception » is far beyond the scope of this essay (it's mys-
teries may well elude scholars for years to come), this brief history of judicial dis-
cretion seeks to provide a crucial piece to that larger puzzle by exploring the way 
elite policy makers used legal reform to forge a truly paternal fatherland13. 
9
 The actual role of the « people »in Mexican politics is a contested issue. Virginia Guedea (1994) argues 
convincingly that they began to play a prominent role in the capital during the Independence period. 
1 0
 See Scardaville (forthcoming). 
1 1
 On popular efforts by prostitutes and criminals to solicit state intervention see Bliss (forthcoming) 
and Piccato (1997a). 
1 2
 Habermas (1989, p. 195). 
1 3
 Seen in this light, the deep historical roots of current president Ernesto Zedillo's early efforts to dif-
fuse criticism of his troubled regime with a highly publicized reform of the criminal justice system 
are very apparent. 
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REJECTING THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
Colonial criminal law institutionalized social inequalities by punishing convic-
ted criminals according to their legally-defined social, racial, or corporate status. 
The shift after Independence to a «liberal» legal system in which all citizens were 
theoretically equal thus marked a watershed in Mexican penal law. 
It was a watershed that would last fifty years ! Drawing on French, Spanish, and 
North American constitutional commitments to «the rights of man and citizen,» 
Mexico's liberal 1824 Constitution guaranteed legal equality for all Mexican citi-
zens thus apparently ending institutionalized discrimination and bolstering the legi-
timacy of secession14. Ironically, the political instability that followed Independence 
forced practitioners to fall back on Spanish colonial criminal (and civil) law and pro-
cedures, especially the medieval Siete Partidas (1265) and the Novísima Recopila-
ción (1805). Supplemented by stop-gap criminal legislation intended to restore 
public order, this confusing situation persisted until the promulgation of a Penal 
Code by the liberal Juárez regime in 187115. 
But despite post-Independence political disputes between liberals and conserva-
tives that blocked attempts to develop a Mexican Penal Code, the reform and codi-
fication of criminal laws was a widely acknowledged desideratum. Early on, Enligh-
tenment-inspired works on crime and punishment had found a sympathetic ear in 
Mexico. In his world-renowned 1764 essay, Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crime and 
Punishment), Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria suggested a rationalization of criminal 
justice that English legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham would later elaborate into a 
utilitarian moral calculus - «the greatest happiness of the greatest number» - and a 
notorious but influential proto-penitentiary, the panopticon16. As «enlightened» 
Bourbon reformers and post-Independence Mexican policy makers struggled with 
the perceived increase in crime that accompanied political and economic moderni-
zation, the legal theories of European social reformers like Beccaria and Bentham 
played an important role in informing the educated public imagination. Even before 
the break with Spain, Mexican-born (if staunchly loyalist) jurist Manuel de Lar-
dizábal y Uribe had insisted that « nothing is more important to a nation than having 
good criminal laws because they ensure civil liberty and, in large part, the well-
being and security of the State». He warned, however, that «there is no enterprise 
more difficult than the perfection of criminal legislation » 1 7. 
Such was the case in independent Mexico. In his 1839 Pandectas Hispano Megi-
canas, Juan N. Rodríguez de San Miguel summarized the practical problems that 
emerged from the colonial legal legacy: 
1 4
 On constitutional guarantees see Rabasa (1990). On European influences on Mexican constitutiona-
lism see Hale (1968). 
1 5
 For histories of Mexican colonial and early national criminal law see Macedo (1931); Refugio 
Gonzalez (1983, p. 12-108); and Vera Estañol (1900-1902, p. 725-773). Perversely, Spain had a 
modern liberal Penal Code by 1848 while Mexican jurists continued to use colonial criminal laws. 
1 6
 Beccaria (1986). On Bentham's utility principle see especially Bentham (1948). For Michel Foucault 
(1979, p. 195-228), Bentham's panopticon provided a paradigm for post-Enlightenment surveillance 
of civil society. The impacts of Beccaria and Bentham on criminology are examined in Monachesi, 
«Cesare Beccaria » and Gilbert Geis, « Jeremy Bentham » in Mannheim (1960, p. 36-67). 
1 7
 Lardizábal y Uribe (1982, p. iii). 
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Our [legislation] after nearly thirty years of revolution, not only of arms, but of 
customs, government, and estate, suffers more than anything from the complica-
tion, diversity, and uncertainty of the laws... [which] retard the administration of 
justice, hinder the response and ability of the authorities, and impede the investi-
gation of cases...18. 
Apart from its unwieldiness, this convoluted legacy, in the biased eyes of liberal 
reformers, threatened the legitimacy of a new order that promised legal equality to 
all citizens. Liberal theorist Jose Maria Luis Mora even reprinted a Bourbon era cri-
tique of colonial criminal justice that warned of the dangers of legal discrimination: 
«What affection», it inquired: 
what benevolence can [castas and indios] feel towards the ministers of the law 
that only exercise authority in order to send them to jail, the gibbet (picota), the 
presidio, or the gallows? What bonds can link these classes to a government 
whose protection they are incapable of comprehending19? 
In an era of political violence that exacerbated elite fears of popular mobilization 
such warnings seemed prescient; the need to reform criminal law painfully obvious. 
« Criminal legislations Mora's liberal colleague Manuel Otero advised, «is at the 
same time the foundation and proof of social institutions». And, while recognizing 
the inevitability of crime, he argued that the conscientious legislator «needs to 
demonstrate his genius by conquering bad inclinations, setting men on the path of 
duty... governing society, pushing it towards the good, guiding it to perfection»20. 
For Otero, good criminal laws would not only repress the criminal but instruct the 
potential citizen thereby ensuring their popular acceptance, a necessary prerequisite 
to social progress in a modern democratic republic. 
One proposed solution was adoption of the jury system. Mora even advocated 
popular juries in an 1827 «dissertation» for his law degree noting that jurors were 
less susceptible to corruption than judges and more in tune with the criminal justice 
system's typically lower-class clientele. «The knowledge of persons», he pointed 
out, 
their habits and customs, their vices and virtues, and their individual character, 
are beyond the reach of a judge who knows little about them and before whom 
they necessarily dissemble, as do most of their fellow citizens with whom they 
[the accused, witnesses etc.] contract the relations that allows them [their fellow 
citizens on the jury] to know and evaluate the degree of probability or certitude 
that ought to be given to testimony and motives21. 
For Mora, then, only an English or North American-style jury of peers could 
transcend the profound class divisions in Mexican society and provide the unders-
tanding and insight necessary to a fair trial. 
Concern about popular justice carried over to the liberal 1857 Constitutional 
Congress where commission members revived Mora's arguments in favor of popu-
lar juries. They noted in their initial proposal that «the sovereignty of the people, the 
1 8
 Quoted in Refugio González, (1983, p. 49-50). 
1 9
 Mora(1986-1988a,p.63). 
2 0
 Otero (1967, p. 653-654). 
2 1
 Mora(1986-1988b,p.250). 
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foundation of republican principles, point of departure for all its applications, secure 
gauge for the solution of all its problems, is incomprehensible, is inconceivable, 
without the institution of the jury » 2 2 . In what was to become a classic riposte, oppo-
nents countered that juries were inappropriate for « our population and territory », 
because to be effective they required an educated, moral citizenry which « i s disgra-
cefully not characteristic of most of our population » 2 3 . Not surprisingly, in 1869, 
when legislators amended criminal procedures to include juries for some cases, they 
compromised; literacy and income requirements effectively excluded lower-class 
participation 2 4. 
But in spite of disputes over the extent of popular empowerment, legal reformers 
clearly recognized the pressing need to reform criminal laws and procedures. They 
also stressed the importance of popular acceptance of, if not always active partici-
pation in, the criminal justice system. In fact, attempts to reconcile (at least discur-
sively) the potentially conflicted requirements of appropriate institutions and popu-
lar acceptance became the hallmark of future Mexican criminal jurisprudence. By 
the mid nineteenth century the terms of the debate had been chosen; the exact mea-
ning of those terms, however, was far from clear. 
CODIFYING CRIMINAL LAW 
The promulgation of the liberal 1857 Constitution which included Mexico's first 
real bill of rights marked the crucial first step toward the codification of Mexican cri-
minal law. The Constitution officially ended many of the more onerous aspects of 
colonial criminal law: not only legal discrimination, but also most special tribunals, 
unauthorized arrest, lengthy detention, torture, unlawful seizure of property, and 
transcendental punishment. Procedure was reformed as well. The Constitution elimi-
nated court fees, making the judicial system economically accessible to all Mexicans. 
Article 2 0 guaranteed Mexican citizens accused of crimes the following rights: 
I. That they be informed of the motive for the proceeding and the name of the 
accuser if one existed. 
II. That their preliminary statement be taken within forty-eight hours... 
III. That they be allowed to confront the witnesses against them. 
IV. That they have easy access to the facts needed to prepare their defense. 
V. That they and persons they trusted be allowed to testify on their behalf. And, if 
they had no one to defend them, that they be given a list of public defenders 
from which to choose 2 5 . 
2 2
 Zarco(1956,p.316). 
23
 Ibid., p. 351. Mexico's relative backwardness also served to justify keeping the death penalty until 
the development of a reformative penitentiary system. Capital punishment was, however, restricted 
to serious crimes like murder and political criminals, excepting traitors, were no longer eligible for 
execution. Ibid., p. 1347. 
2 4
 Rebollar (1894a, p. XLIX-L and 1894b, p. 8-9). 
2 5
 Zarco (1956, p. 1345-1348). Transcendental punishment was directed not just at the individual but at 
the family as well. The typical transcendental punishment in Spanish colonial law was infamy which 
carried down to the fourth generation, denying the condemned access to royal favors and public 
employment. 
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Drafters of the 1857 Constitution clearly intended these rights, typical of most 
nineteenth-century liberal constitutions, to correct the most egregious failures of 
colonial criminal justice, facilitate popular acceptance of the liberal regime, and set 
the parameters of subsequent criminal law. 
These lofty goals were not easily realized. By incorporating controversial 
« reform » laws that sought to undermine the considerable power of corporate enti-
ties like the Catholic Church and the army, the 1857 Constitution sparked a bloody 
three-year civil war. With the legal assault on corporations tearing Mexico apart, the 
liberal push to reform criminal law, a generally well-regarded and non-controversial 
project, became even more acute. In 1862, with the liberals temporarily victorious, 
Benito Juarez's Minister of Justice Jesus Terán appointed a commission to formulate 
a Penal Code for the Federal District and Territory of Baja California. His conserva-
tive opponents, however, were far from finished. The successful French invasion in 
May of the following year and puppet emperor Maximilian's subsequent three-year 
reign further delayed liberal penal reform efforts. But, following liberal victory in 
1867, Juarez reformed his cabinet, appointing former Penal Code commission mem-
ber Antonio Martinez de Castro as his Minister of Justice and Public Instruction. 
Martinez de Castro moved quickly. Just a year later, the Penal Code commission 
was up and running again26. In his 1868 message to Congress, he reminded deputies 
of the legitimizing potential of reformed criminal laws. «The punishments applied 
today are truly arbitrary», Martinez de Castro admonished, «and ought to be repla-
ced by others better suited to the nature of the crimes, and which will not deprive pri-
soners of their modesty, their shame, nor the hope of rehabilitating themselves in the 
public eye». He added with a characteristic utilitarian faith in the value of public 
instruction that: 
...in publishing a good Penal Code that even the poorest can acquire at little cost, 
so that they might learn their duties, know the deformity of crime, and advise 
themselves of the punishments they might incur, one will doubtless see a rapid 
decline in the number of delinquents27. 
Appropriately enough, as Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, Martinez de 
Castro was charged not only with drafting a Penal Code but also with educating the 
populace so that they could read it. These were the halcyon days of public education 
in Mexico; although the most notable achievement, Gabino Barreda's founding of 
the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria with its « scientific » positivist education, benefit-
ed mostly elite males. Unfortunately, the immense task of educating the lower classes 
and thus realizing Martinez de Castro's dream of a didactic Penal Code would 
quickly prove beyond the means (and possibly the intentions) of the fledgling liberal 
state. Nevertheless, the desire to win popular acceptance for the criminal justice sys-
tem, and thus legitimacy for the liberal regime, persisted, and with some success. 
The promulgation of the Federal District Penal Code on April 1, 1871 ended the 
long gestation of Mexican criminal law28. As Martinez de Castro had promised, it 
2 6
 Ceniceros (1964, p. 182-185). Background on the Penal Code commission is also included in Marti-
nez de Castro (1968, p. 132-133). 
2 7
 Quoted in Pina y Palacios (1968, p. 131). 
2 8
 The State of Vera Cruz, generally at the forefront of Mexican criminology and penology, promulga-
ted the nation's first Penal Code on May 5,1869 but it lacked the prestige and influence of the 1871 
Federal District code. 
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aspired to be both modern and popular. And, although modeled on the 1848 and 
1870 Spanish Penal Codes, even to the point of copying grammatical errors, the 
Mexican code made a deliberate appeal to nationalist sentiment29. In his «Exposi-
tion of Motives» Martinez de Castro cited Montesquieu's classic comments on 
appropriate legislation, a favorite of Mexican jurists, and added his own specific if 
typically restrained critique of Spanish colonial criminal law. « Formed in large part 
centuries ago by absolutist governments », he observed, «in times of ignorance and 
for a different kind of people with different customs and education, [Spanish crimi-
nal laws] have no place in independent, republican, and democratic Mexico where 
equality is dogma, where one enjoys liberties and rights unknown in the times of 
Alonso el Sabio » 3 0. This Penal Code was, for its principal author, both conceptually 
up-to-date and eminently suited to Mexico's unique historical and geographical 
situation, two crucial criteria at least for elite acceptance. 
The code was also designed to attract the popular support deemed crucial to 
domestic tranquility. After the fifty years of post-Independence turmoil, Martinez de 
Castro concluded, «the authorities have not been able to count on public coopera-
tion, and because of this they have been unable to guarantee the public security 
which is essential to the prosperity of the arts, industry, and commerce » 3 1. A well-
ordered, easily accessible Penal Code that promised speedy, impartial, moderate jus-
tice ; that reformed prisons, ended presidio confinements, and forced labor seemed 
just the remedy for Mexico's ills. The 1871 Penal Code thus attacked the perceived 
essence of the colonial criminal justice system: inhumane punishment and exces-
sive judicial discretion which encouraged arbitrary justice. 
To ensure impartiality and moderation, the code provided an elaborately calibra-
ted system of punishments that left little room for the capricious exercise of judicial 
discretion by an individual magistrate. A product of classic criminology via English 
legal theorist Jeremy Bentham, this punitive calculus reflected Martinez de Castro's 
profound faith in human rationality32. Article 4 stated plainly that «Crime is: the 
voluntary infraction of a penal law, doing that which it prohibits or neglecting to do 
that which it demands»33 (CP: 7. My italics). Further, those without the ability to 
reason - young children, the insane, the senile, deaf mutes, and even loyal servants 
acting under orders - lacked the requisite « criminal responsibility » or «imputabi-
lity » and could not be convicted of a crime34 (CP: 13-14,47). 
Assuming a rational, « responsible » criminal meant that punishments could be 
rationalized as well. And, to ensure that judicial rationality was exercised in the 
national interest rather than in the personal or class interests of an individual magis-
trate, this system was deliberately formulaic. For example, the Penal Code recogni-
zed four levels of criminal acts - planned, intended, frustrated, consummated - each 
punished with increasing severity (CP: 10). It also recognized four classes of atte-
nuating and aggravating circumstances with each circumstance augmenting or dimi-
2 9
 The grammatical errors are noted in Almaraz (1941, p. 15-16). 
3 0
 Martínez de Castro (1931, p. 132). 
31
 Ibid., p. 133. 
3 2
 See especially Bentham (1948). This work was first published in 1789. 
33
 Código Penal... (1890) (Hereafter CP ; specific page references are cited in the text). 
3 4
 If they represented a danger to society they could, under certain circumstances, be institutionalized 
in asylums or special juvenile facilities. 
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nishing punishment by a set proportion according to its class. Attenuating circum-
stances could be simply « good prior customs » or anything that indicated a uninten-
tionally diminished capacity to reason such as involuntary drunkenness or gross 
«ignorance». Conversely, aggravating circumstances might include the use of vio-
lence or disguises, taking advantage of a riot, abuse of confidence, or simply having 
had enough education to know better (CP: 14-21). Recidivism, always a source of 
grave concern, was a special aggravating circumstance and could drastically 
increase punishment especially if the repeat offense was more serious than its pre-
decessor (CP: 58-59). Both lists of circumstances were long and fairly explicit, lea-
ving little apparent room for arbitrary judicial maneuvers. Using these pre-deter-
mined formulas, then, a judge need only establish guilt and determine circumstances 
in order to calculate the proper punishment. In this classic liberal formulation of 
«rule of law,» rationality was a systemic rather than an individual trait; pre-deter-
mined punishments, equally applied, ensured impartiality to a presumably skeptical 
people accustomed to capricious colonial justice. The extensive section of the Penal 
Code devoted exclusively to the crimes of public functionaries and legal representa-
tives served a similar redemptive purpose36 (CP: 221-236). 
Judicial discretion, although severely limited, was not without its place in this 
rationalized system. A judge could grant a « preparatory liberty » (libertad prepara-
toria) under police supervision to inmates who exhibited «good behavior»in prison 
and who had the means to support themselves once released. In keeping with its 
rationalist premises, the Penal Code defined good behavior as « positive acts » on the 
part of the inmate, « habits of order, work, and morality, and especially having domi-
nated the passion or inclination that led to crime » 3 7 (CP: 34). Preparatory liberty 
thus rewarded normative behavior and complemented the rehabilitation process 
begun in prison. But the Penal Code limited even this grant of judicial discretion to 
a simple decision for or against the inmate38. Although it clearly recognized the need 
to individualize punishment, the manifesto of later positivist-inspired penology, the 
1871 Penal Code tightly controlled judicial discretion. Liberal « memories » of arbi-
trary colonial justice were still too fresh. 
PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO: THE PORFIRIAN REVISIONS 
This reluctance diminished as the century waned. Firmly in power after the 
defeat and execution of Maximilian in 1867, fin-de-siecle liberal presidents Benito 
Juarez, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, Porfirio Díaz, and Manuel Gonzalez encouraged 
a more authoritarian brand of liberalism that they hoped would undermine the power 
of regional strongmen (caciques) and accelerate national economic development. 
The growing influence of positivist ideas in Mexico - an eclectic mixture of Com-
tean scientism and Spencerian social darwinism - especially during second half of 
3 5
 Writers of official texts like Martinez de Castro conscientiously avoided institutionalizing class 
biases. Nevertheless, in practice, evaluating an attenuating circumstance like «good prior customs» 
inevitably reflected the prejudices of the presiding magistrate. 
3 6
 The ideological impact of these provisions would have been greatly enhanced had Mexican educa-
tors realized Martinez de Castro's vision of a literate general public. 
3 7
 Libertad preparatoria could include up to half of the inmate's original sentence. 
3 S
 Macedo and Ceniceros (1928, p. 26). 
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the Porfiriato (1876-1911) provided ideological justification for oligarchical rule 
(although in a nominally liberal context) and encouraged the development of a 
« scientific politics » appropriately administered by elite technocrats or científicos. 
In spite of its enormous prestige, however, Positivism had little immediate effect 
on Mexican criminal law. Although very much aware of the latest advances in Euro-
pean criminology, including the vigorous debate between Italian and French crimi-
nologists over the principal source (heredity or milieu) of criminal behavior, cientí-
fico reformers preferred a gradualist approach to penal reform that respected the 
integrity of the 1871 code in spite of its presumably metaphysical views on crime 
and punishment. Headed by prominent penologist Miguel S. Macedo, the commis-
sion established in 1903 to revise the Penal Code even refused to correct grammati-
cal or stylistic errors in the text unless these errors obscured or distorted its meaning. 
The commission saw fit only to modify vague language and update laws that had 
proved either too harsh, too lenient or unworkable in the courtroom. For example, 
the commission simplified procedures and encouraged fines rather than incarcera-
tion for those convicted of public drunkenness while at the same time expanding the 
penalties and requirements for recidivism and illegal public disturbances39. In gene-
ral, however, commission members saw little reason to do more than «respect the 
general principles of the 1871 Code, conserve the nucleus of its system and limit 
[themselves] to incorporating only the new precepts or new institutions whose use-
fulness had been proven and whose inclusion is demanded by the present social state 
of the nation » 4 0 . The only significant addition, a North American style parole sys-
tem (condena condicional), did somewhat further judicial discretion and the indivi-
dualization of punishment. Even this «innovation », however, retained the rationa-
list premise that rewarding non-dangerous criminals for good behavior would help 
reverse their descent into criminality. 
In the conservative estimation of penologists like Macedo, practical positivist 
concerns about appropriate response to social realities outweighed the theoretical 
concerns of positivist criminology which argued that proper social defense should 
base the punishment of criminals solely on their « dangerousness » to society. Thus 
the Porfirian Penal Code revisions, finally completed in June, 1912 during Francisco 
Madero's troubled presidency, modified rather than revised Martinez's liberal 
code41. In his chapter on Mexico's «judicial evolution » in the ambitious Porfirian 
positivist history, México: su evolución social, Jorge Vera Estañol explained this 
legal conservatism in social darwinistic terms. « An abyss», he observed, «divides 
societies whose progress is intrinsic from those that have managed it thanks to the 
irresistible contagion of foreign institutions ». He added pessimistically that «only 
time is capable of serving as a gigantic bridge to a vigorous race » 4 2. For Porfirian 
penologists, the liberal legal revolution that overthrew the colonial legal system 
3 9
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ness)). The commission recommended that habitual criminals, including vagrants and beggars, be 
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represented a premature, ill-considered (although most agreed necessary and inevi-
table) attempt to radically alter Mexican society. Conversely, this time around, an 
appropriate response would respect social realities including the need to modernize 
(socially at least) in a gradual, controlled fashion. Legal evolution would occur in 
Mexico but slowly so as not to disturb newly won « order and progress ». The argu-
ment was positivistic but reflected a profoundly conservative positivism that defi-
ned social change in nearly glacial terms. Paradoxically, by the early years of the 
twentieth century, the post-Independence liberal legal revolution had become a per-
manent fixture of the social landscape, an institution to be carefully nurtured and 
perhaps judiciously modified but never unduly shocked or uprooted. The Mexican 
Revolution would change all that. 
PUNISHING THE CRIMINAL: 
THE REVOLUTION AND POSITIVIST PENOLOGY 
Disorganized and unsystematic, Porfirian criminology had been ill-equipped to 
challenge the legal establishment. A criminologist of sorts himself, Macedo had 
publicly criticized liberal penology and lauded the «ever broadening horizons» 
opened by the « study of crime as a natural phenomenon » 4 3. Positivist criminology, 
however, had more impact on his discourse than his Penal Code reforms. A traditio-
nalist at heart, he continued to use classical legal texts in his law classes44. Never-
theless, the professionalization of criminology and the consolidation of the scienti-
fic criminological paradigm in the years following the Revolution had made the 
positivist criminological agenda more difficult to ignore45. 
In the eyes of most knowledgeable observers, positivist critiques called into 
question the continued legitimacy and, by extension, the legitimizing potential of 
Mexican criminal law. Coming on the heels of a massive social revolution that pro-
mised social justice for all Mexicans, the push for legal reform to complement poli-
tical change took on still greater intensity. Even Macedo's conservative colleague, 
law professor Antonio Ramos Pedrueza began his revolutionary-era course in penal 
law with a detailed discussion of the relative merits of classic and positivist crimi-
nology that attacked the underlying premises of Mexican criminal law46. Taking ins-
piration from Italian criminologist Enrico Ferri, Ramos concluded that the rational 
criminal, the foundation of classic criminology, had never existed. « Observed rea-
lity in prisons and asylums affirms that delinquents are abnormal», he noted, 
«...admitting nevertheless that they are very different and that the passage from har-
dened criminal type to normal human type is not a brusque transition but a series of 
gradations, just as in animal species ». After positivist criminologists' discovery of 
4 3
 Macedo (1954, p. 381). In this speech, Macedo argued in favor of «conditional» punishments but 
added that Mexico lacked the institutional infrastructure - modern prisons, trained personnel, effec-
tive criminal procedures - to support a parole system (ibid., p. 394-395). 
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the criminal's inherent abnormality (typically signified by irrational behavior), 
Ramos argued that subsequent legislation and judicial practice should seek to judge 
not the «criminal and the crime» but the «criminal in the crime»47. The positivists' 
insistence on individualizing punishment in order to better rehabilitate the criminal 
but especially to « defend » society by keeping dangerous criminals off the streets 
(regardless of the severity of their actual crime) was beginning to make serious 
inroads into mainstream Mexican legal theory as well. José Angel Ceniceros, acting 
as adjunct professor in a 1926 course in penal law directed by his mentor Miguel 
Macedo, noted that «crime, more than an act is a state [of mind]»48. The translation 
of positivist theory into practice lacked only opportunity. 
That opportunity came in 1925 when President Plutarco Calles created revisory 
commissions to bring Mexico's various legal codes into line with the 1917 Consti-
tution and with post-revolutionary expectations. A year later, the fateful addition of 
committed positivist José Almaraz to the Penal Code commission (which included 
Ramos Pedrueza) marked the beginning of a frontal assault on classical criminology 
and the 1871 Penal Code. In Almaraz's eyes, Mexico's latest perceived crime wave 
testified to the ineffectualness of the existing Penal Code which he blamed on its 
theoretical poverty. «The classical school,» Almaraz recalled, «had become com-
pletely bankrupt and could no longer serve as the foundation for penal legislation » 4 9 
(ECP : 11-12). With this blunt assessment, the revisory commission set out to bring 
Mexican criminal laws into line with modern positivist penal theory. 
What the commission attempted was nothing less than a theoretical revolution in 
Mexican criminal law. As positivists, they insisted on contextualizing crime. The 
classical school, Almaraz observed with some exaggeration, « forgets the criminal 
and concerns itself only with the crime committed ». Attempting « absolute mathe-
matical equality between crime and punishment », he insisted, often resulted in inap-
propriate punishments. This formulaic system inevitably released unreformed dan-
gerous criminals back into society, while at the same time it condemned relatively 
harmless incidental criminals to the corrupting influence of prison confinement. 
Under the classical legal regimen, Almaraz declared, « the toxic current of crime 
grows day by day» (ECP : 14-15). As an antidote to this misguided rationalism, the 
commission argued for a fundamental redefinition of the criminal act as « a natural 
product, born not of free will but of physical, anthropological, and social factors » 
(ECP : 18). The theoretical inspiration was probably French sociologist Emile Dur-
kheim whose influential 1893 Rules of the Sociological Method had insisted that 
crime was a normal «social fact» in all human societies. Moreover, with a purpor-
tedly revolutionary regime in power, lingering social inequalities - exacerbated loy 
Porfirian abuses - provided an easy scapegoat for Mexico's latest crime wave and 
helped legitimize the new political order bent on their eventual elimination. 
Having determined the causes of crime, the commission then sought to redefine 
criminal responsibility. For classical penology, establishing the rationality of the 
individual criminal was a prerequisite to punishment; to positivists like Almaraz, 
this seemed absurd. « Given that infractors reveal hereditary or acquired, permanent 
or temporary bio-psychic anomalies,* Almaraz argued, « the foundations of a fight 
47
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against delinquency based on moral responsibility disappear and the entire classical 
edifice comes crashing to the ground ». He concluded that healthy,« rational» socie-
ties, in a social darwinistic spirit of self preservation, protected themselves from all 
threats regardless of motivation. In fact, this conflation of social health and social 
rationality effectively denied rationality to any individual «organism» that threate-
ned society's collective well-being. Recognizing this fundamental discursive shift, 
Almaraz proposed that «social responsibility» replace moral responsibility and that 
« sanctions » substitute for punishments in a more workable, non-moralistic system 
of « social defense » (ECP: 18-19). 
This discursive shift carried two important corollaries. First, by privileging an 
abstraction, criminality, over the more narrow category of lawbreaker it encompas-
sed many more people. « An individual can be dangerous to society », Almaraz advi-
sed, «even before committing a crime (lesionar un derecho)» and he especially sin-
gled out alcoholics, drug addicts, vagrants, beggars, and even paranoids (ECP: 20). 
Mexican elites had traditionally persecuted most of these groups. Nevertheless the 
legal sanctioning of potentially (but not always technically) criminal categories -
punishing states of mind rather than pre-defined criminal acts - was one inevitable 
and potentially portentous consequence of using social defense as the principal cri-
teria for criminal law. « All law is essentially doctrine », Almaraz reminded his rea-
ders, «... politically personalized doctrine» (ECP: 12. His italics). 
The second corollary, typical of positivist endeavors, was a considerable expan-
sion in the prestige and scope of scientifically trained experts. Any serious attempt 
to transcend a relatively simple determination of guilt and to evaluate the 
dangerousness (estado peligroso) of an individual criminal required considerable 
expertise. Almaraz warned that «the prior and indispensable study of the delin-
quent's integral personality demands functionaries and judges trained in the modern 
doctrines of criminal psychology» among which he included everything from 
endocrinology to the interpretation of tattoos (ECP: 100). This new requirement 
was clearly self-serving and designed to insinuate criminology into the justice sys-
tem by creating professional spaces for trained criminologists. It also ensured their 
domination of legal discourse. To this end, the 1929 Penal Code established a 
Supreme Council of Social Defense and Prevention to oversee the entire federal 
prison and detention system, supervise the «individualization of punishment,» and 
ensure that criminal justice personnel upheld the basic tenets of social defense 
(ECP: 54). 
Other innovative features appeared as provisions of the new Penal Code. For 
example, in an effort to individualize punishment - to make the punishment suit the 
criminal rather than the crime - the revisory commission greatly expanded the alter-
natives to incarceration by broadening the parole system (condena condicional) and 
substituting fines for short sentences. To support these changes, the commission 
revived the time-honored complaint about corrupting prisons. «It is necessary to 
oppose short incarcerations », it advised,« which in their current form fail to correct, 
intimidate, or inoculate; but which oblige the first-time offender to transform him-
self into a professional [criminal]» (ECP: 53). Therapeutic solutions, especially for 
juveniles and the insane, were favored over simple incarceration and, in keeping 
with the principles of social defense, sanctions against the dangerous criminally 
insane could be extended indefinitely. Not surprisingly, this broadening of « sanc-
tions » required not only more professional training but greater judicial discretion in 
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sentencing as well , albeit under the watchful eye of the Supreme Council and its 
ever-vigilant president, José Almaraz. 
Liberal human rights provisions of the 1917 Constitution, however, thwarted 
efforts to formulate a truly positivist Penal Code. Punishing everyone judged dan-
gerous to society clearly violated basic constitutional guarantees. « Since the Consti-
tution prevents the realization of all the logical consequences that can be derived 
from the adoption of the principle of social defense,» Almaraz noted with regret, 
« the Revisory Commission had to forego many important innovations » (ECP : 49) . 
This gave the new Penal Code a « transitory » character, at least in the eyes o f 
its principal architect. These gaps between theory and practice also provided 
future opponents of the code an easy avenue of attack; an avenue that they quickly 
exploited. 
PRAGMATISM OVER POSITIVISM: 
THE LEGAL ESTABLISHMENT RESPONDS 
Legal establishment attacks on the 1929 Penal Code were swift and devastating. 
Critics complained that the new code, for all its theoretical innovations was incon-
sistent, unnecessarily radical, and unacceptably impractical. Future professor of cri-
minal law Juan José Gonzá lez Bustamante, a young lawyer at the time and a former 
Macedo student, recalled Almaraz's discursive revolution as : 
simply a conceit (snobismo), an irresponsible word play, because Penal Law is 
fundamentally a protector of society and punishment is essentially retributive and 
is imposed as a necessary evil in order to procure the conservation of social 
order... If the means employed, whether it is called punishment or sanction, pro-
duces even a little suffering on the part of its recipient we must conclude that it is 
indeed a punishment...50 
Other critics lauded Almaraz's efforts to supplant out-dated classical precepts 
but argued that the new code failed to live up to its promise. One observer noted that 
«the code suffered from redundancies, occasional duplicity of concepts, contradic-
tions and difficulties of application» 5 1 . These obvious defects encouraged an over-
determined criticism that attacked the code's internal contradictions, theoretical 
foundations, and constitutionality. Another critic, for example, observed that 
although the code was purportedly based on theories of social defense and dange-
rousness in fact it retained the « objective criteria » of classical penology, in particu-
lar the formulaic system of aggravating and attenuating circumstances of the 1871 
Penal Code. Also , its expanded system of sanctions included a confusing table of 
indemnizations and an elaborate system of fines based on income which made admi-
nistration time-consuming and difficult 5 2 . Gonzá lez added that condemning « delin-
quents, the insane, idiots, imbeciles or those who suffer any other debility, illness or 
mental anomaly » to indefinite internment was « a wise security measure but 
contrary to dictates of the Constitution » 5 3 . Most critics agreed on the need to bring 
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the Penal Code into line with modern criminological theory. Many, however, insis-
ted that the 1929 code had missed the point, promising a theoretical innovation that 
it failed to deliver and which was furthermore unsuited to Mexico's social and 
constitutional realities. Not coincidentally, these defects also undermined its ideolo-
gical potential. 
In the face of this barrage of criticism, interim president Emilio Portes Gil 
quickly established a new revisory commission. To avoid future dissension and 
resistance, the five voting members of the commission represented the heart of the 
capital's legal establishment: the Interior Ministry, Attorney General of the Repu-
blic, Attorney General of the Federal District and territories, Federal District Super-
ior Court, Penal Courts. Representatives of the Supreme Council of Social Defense 
and Prevention and the previous revisory commission were in attendance but only 
as non-voting advisors54. The two most prominent voting members, José Angel 
Ceniceros and Luis Garrido, were Macedo acolytes and vocal critics of the 1929 
code. 
Given the practical orientation and relative conservatism of the new revisory 
commission, the repudiation of Almaraz's dogmatic positivism was inevitable. Gar-
rido noted that: 
most of us had been brought up on the Comtism of the old National Preparatory 
School and viewed with great sympathy the survival of positivism in the modern 
schools of penology, without finding feasible the construction of a code based 
exclusively on positivist principles55. 
The stated principles of the 1931 Penal Code then included not only the standard 
admonition to simplicity and clarity but a promise to modernize only « up to the 
point permitted by our constitutional framework, our judicial traditions, and our 
social and economic conditions » 5 6. Commission spokesman Alfonso Teja Zabre 
argued that: 
No school, doctrine, or penal system can serve as the integral foundation of a 
Penal Code. It is possible only to follow an eclectic and pragmatic tendency 
which is to say practical and realizable57. 
Thus instead of positivist dogma, commission members focused on « pragma-
tic » means. Specific goals included a simplification of procedures, the effective 
reparation of damages, the individualization of punishment, a decreased reliance on 
abstract ethical standards (casuismo), and an increase in judicial discretion within 
constitutional limits58. The first two of these five goals addressed the practical fai-
lings of the 1929 code, the next two restated positivist critiques of classical peno-
logy. The last goal - increased judicial discretion - represented the new Penal 
Code's principal innovation. 
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Articles 51 and 52 codified this increase in judicial discretion. Article 51 advi-
sed judges «inside legally-fixed limits» to take under consideration both « external 
circumstances » and «the peculiarities of the delinquent». Article 52 suggested that 
along with the traditional mitigating circumstances judges also consider «the spe-
cial conditions in which [the delinquent] found himself at the moment the crime was 
committed and other personal antecedents and conditions... that demonstrate his 
greater or lesser dangerousness (temibilidad)»59. Ceniceros and Garrido even sug-
gested that the positivist motto, «There are no crimes only criminals », should be 
modified to «There are no criminals only men» 6 0. This mixture of traditional and 
modern, liberal and positivist, concerns typified the self-consciously pragmatic 
nature of the new code. 
Like each of their predecessors, the supporters of the 1931 code argued that the 
new Penal Code was the first to reflect national realities. One observer noted that the 
1931 code «modestly but firmly develops its desiderata in accordance with naked 
Mexican reality... recognizing, organizing, and balancing reality itself » 6 1. Another 
remarked that: 
The division of classes and castes by economic and racial differences in Mexico, 
causes grave difficulties in the application of penal laws, especially for unassimi-
lated indigenous groups... The only recourse is to simplify norms and procedures, 
prescribing broad and generic regulations that effectively permit the individuali-
zation of sanctions62. 
The argument that culturally and racially heterogenous Mexico required greater 
judicial latitude accorded with post-revolutionary concerns about addressing the 
needs of the now mobilized popular sectors. While the 1929 code had attempted a 
re-theorization of criminal law that appealed primarily to elite modernizers, the 
drafters of the 1931 Penal Code sought a broader audience. By individualizing 
punishment, they not only protected society from dangerous criminals but protected 
relatively harmless offenders from an arbitrary, mechanistic justice that even their 
positivist predecessors had been unable to supplant. To this end, the new code broa-
dened the range of punishments and abandoned the elaborate calculus of aggrava-
ting and attenuating circumstances that had characterized the two previous codes. 
The expanded discretionary powers of the judge permitted a flexibility impos-
sible under previous Penal Codes. The ideological benefits of a more responsive jus-
tice system were obvious. Previously marginalized groups could now hope for cle-
mency from a sympathetic if paternalistic judge - a throwback to the colonial 
tradition of royal mercy preserved perhaps in more informal justice systems and 
thus eminently suited to perceived Mexican social realities63. The international 
vogue for state socialism and the desire to institutionalize (and thus control) popular 
justice doubtless encouraged paternalistic solutions as well. 
In this case at least, modernity and tradition were not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. Garrido's three criteria for the Penal Code included consideration of «the 
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Mexican juridical tradition... the doctrines and sentiments of the people... [and] the 
conditions of Mexico's collective l i fe». He added that «the work thus realized 
sought to establish itself in human terms... in a dynamic relation between penal 
norms and social reality (realidad del ambiente)»64. In fact these apparently contra-
dictory sources enhanced the 1931 code's ideological possibilities. Because it could 
appeal to both modernizers and traditionalists, paternalistic discretionary justice 
seemed the ideal solution to the admittedly complex and contradictory legitimation 
problems generated by a wildly heterogenous society. Theoretically at least, indivi-
dual judges could tailor the law to the social, cultural, and even racial circumstances 
of their clientele. 
S o m e observers recognized potential dangers. Reviving traditional liberal 
concerns, one commentator warned that «judicial discretion requires a broad unders-
tanding on the part of those charged with applying the law, in order that it not turn into 
arbitrariness» . The possible dangers of paternalism, however, seemed a small price 
to pay for the popular acceptance that would presumably result from a more flexible 
criminal justice system. « A fundamentally humane justice», Garrido advised, «... 
will take into account the sensibilities of the transgressor», adding that,« punishing a 
man of exquisite sensibilities is not the same as punishing a calloused and crude 
m a n » 6 6 . The argument could have come from Lardizábal himself. By the third 
decade of the twentieth century colonial legal institutions had receded far enough into 
the historical past to be viewed with a certain dispassionate nostalgia; the dangers of 
arbitrary justice somewhat mitigated by the assumed benefits of a paternal state. 
The paternalism implicit in individualizing punishment was nothing new. Alma-
raz's code, for example, had fostered the paternalistic pretensions of positive crimi-
nology and by extension the place of positive criminologists in the criminal justice 
system. The Supreme Council of Social Defense and Prevention's central role in 
ensuring ideological correctness, however, had rankled the legal establishment. His 
opponents, most of them judges trained in criminology, had resisted this oversight 
for both practical and professional reasons; it created administrative problems and 
it usurped their authority. Increased judicial discretion, on the other hand, transfer-
red that authority from the Supreme Council (which subsequently dropped the 
« supreme » from its title) to the judges themselves. This represented a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for positive criminology: while it did permit judges greater latitude to indivi-
dualize punishment, the insistence on observing constitutional forms and thus meta-
physical liberal notions of human rights precluded any legal justification for a 
comprehensive program of social defense 6 7 . Consequently, after 1931, criminology 
became the handmaiden rather than the ultimate arbiter of the modern Mexican cri-
minal justice system. And again, theoretical inconsistencies - the mish-mash of libe-
ralism, state socialism, and neo-paternalism masquerading as «pragmatism* (or 
even Hegelian synthesis) - probably enhanced the 1931 Penal Code's ideological 
potential by appealing to a broad social spectrum for a wide variety of reasons 6 8 . 
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CONCLUSION 
Evaluating the practical impact of legal reforms on the Mexican criminal justice 
system is considerably more difficult than determining its ideological contribution. 
Mexican criminal justice, like criminal justice in general, retains an important mea-
sure of its legitimacy through an inherent conservatism that respects the traditional 
expectations of its practitioners and clients. This conservative tendency must be 
acknowledged. When change occurs, its occurs most often at the ideological rather 
than the practical level ; traditional forms take on new content without seriously 
affecting long-standing legal ritual. Whatever its practical consequences, drafters of 
the 1931 Penal Code, most of them judges themselves, returned limited discretio-
nary powers to presiding magistrates so that they might better exercise a presuma-
bly flexible and benevolent judicial paternalism - a ideological harbinger of, per-
haps even a rehearsal for, an estado papa whose supremacy is only now under 
serious challenge. 
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